O caso contra patentes

The Case Against Patents
Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine
First draft: January 29, 2012
This draft: June 29, 2012
1. Introduction
The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve
to increase innovation and productivity, unless the latter is identified with the number of patents awarded
– which, as evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity. This is at the root of the
“patent puzzle”: in spite of the enormeous increase in the number of patents and in the strength of their
legal protection we have neither seen a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a
major increase in the levels of R&D expenditure – in addition to the discussion in this paper, see Lerner
[2009] and literature therein. As we shall see, there is strong evidence, instead, that patents have many
negative consequences. Both of these observations, the evidence in support of which has grown steadily
over time, are consistent with theories of innovation that emphasize competition and first-mover
advantage as the main drivers of innovation and directly contradict “Schumpeterian” theories postulating
that government granted monopolies are crucial in order to provide incentives for innovation. The
differing predictive and explanatory powers of the two alternative classes of models persist when
attention is shifted to the historical evidence on the life-cycle of industries. The initial eruption of small
and large innovations leading to the creation of a new industry – from chemicals to cars, from radio and
TV to personal computers and investment banking – is seldom, if ever, born out of patent protection and
is, instead, the fruits of highly competitive-cooperative environments. It is only after the initial stages of
explosive innovation and rampant growth end that mature industries turn toward the legal protection of
patents, usually because their internal grow potential diminishes and the industry structure become
concentrated.
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