sexta-feira, 8 de novembro de 2013

A diferência entre decisão coletiva e individual

The Collective Is Not a Relevant Alternative to the Individual

by Don Boudreaux on November 7, 2013
Perhaps the most advanced topic that I cover every semester in my Principles of Microeconomics class at George Mason University is (Kenneth) Arrow‘s Impossibility Theorem.  (I do so in the context of a larger discussion featuring public-choice economics.)  I do not go into the mathematics of the Theorem, but I do give some classic demonstrations of this important theory.
My takeaway understanding of this Theorem is that it – along with each of many other works in the broad category of the economics of collective decision-making – demonstrates the error, and the consequent danger, of anthropomorphizing any collective.  It shows the mistake of presuming that a collective that “chooses” (say, through majoritarian voting) candidate over candidates and C, or policy over policies Y and Z, can in any sensible way thought to be very much like an individual human being who chooses option A or course-of-action X.
Collectives are not sentient human beings.  It is folly to suppose that just because each member of the collective has some voice in determining the actions of the collective, that the collective thereby is some sort of scaled-up human-like decision-maker.  It is not, and it cannot be.
One feature of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is its insistence on the importance of the criterion called “independence of irrelevant alternatives.”  This criterion...
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