Distribuição da inovação

Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts
Roberta Dessí∗
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI) and CEPR†.
September 13, 2011
Abstract
Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting
from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example.
There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts:
California contracts are more "incomplete". This paper proposes an economic
explanation for these observations, often attributed to regional cultural
differences. In the presence of significant spillovers, it becomes optimal
for an innovative start-up and its financier to adopt contracts with fewer
contingencies: these contracts maximize their ability to extract (part of)
the surplus they generate through positive spillovers. This relaxes ex-ante
financing constraints and makes it possible to induce higher innovative effort.
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